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THE LUKE EFFECT AND FEDERAL
TAXATION: A COMMENTARY ON
MCMAHON'S THE MATTHEW EFFECT
AND FEDERAL TAXATION
DEBORAH H. SCHENK *
Abstract: Professor Martin J. McMahon, Jr.'s Article demonstrates that
the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer in the United States,
that something must be done to deal with increasing income inequality,
and that income tax rates should be more progressive. Increasing tax
rates on the super-rich as he suggests, however, will not eliminate these
problems by itself. There is no way to decrease income inequality
without increasing rate progressivity on a wider range of taxpayers. To
do so would be politically problematic, and it therefore seems unlikely
that these problems can be solved through the federal tax system.
INTRODUCTION
A substantial portion of Professor Martin J. McMahon, Jr.'s Article
is devoted to a presentation of empirical data to prove the Matthew ef-
fect—that in the past twenty-five years in the United States the rich have
been getting richer and the poor poorer.' Professor McMahon does a
superb job of marshaling the evidence to show the increasing concen-
tration of income and wealth in the top 1% of taxpayers and particu-
larly in the top of that top 1%.2 His primary point is that the super-rich
are getting even richer and at a faster rate than are the rich. 3
I. PROFESSOR MCMAHON'S PROPOSITIONS
Professor McMahon first demonstrates the increasing disparities in
before-tax income. 4 The data he assembles certainly confirm that the
* Marilynn and Ronald Grossman Professor of Taxation, New York University School
of Law.
Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993,
993-94 (2004).
2 See id. at 998-1012.
5 Id.
4 Id.
1129
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size of the slice of the pie commandeered by the top income cohorts is
increasing.5 My only comment with respect to this presentation is that
most of the data Professor McMahon uses probably understate the
phenomenon. Except for the statistics on wealth, the remaining data
are based on various noncomprehensive definitions of income . 5 For
example, the most detailed data that Professor McMahon presents are
the Congressional Budget Office (the "CBO") data, and its measure of
"income" does not include unrealized appreciation.? That also is true
of the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") data, which use adjusted
gross income.5 Professor McMahon notes that the key to joining the
"Fortunate 400" is capital gains. 9 In the top one-half of 1% of income
cohorts, capital gains approach or exceed 20% of income. 10
Nevertheless, the dominant form of income for all income cohorts
remains wage income." At least in the two top quintiles, that is partially
because unrealized capital appreciation is excluded. If realized capital
gains and periodic income from capital are highly concentrated in the
highest income cohorts, then one can safely assume that unrealized
capital gains are also highly concentrated in the highest income co-
horts. 12 This is borne out by Professor McMahon's presentation of data
with respect to wealth. 19 Although these data do not perfectly correlate
5 See id.
6 McMahon, supra note 1, at 999.
7 See CONG, BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES, 1997 TO 2000, at 3-4 (2003).
8 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2001: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS
13-15, 18 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0„id=96586,00.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2004). Congress's definition of adjusted gross income does not include unre-
alized appreciation. See I.R.C. § 61 (2000) (defining gross income); Id. § 62 (defining ad-
justed gross income).
9 McMahon, supra note 1, at 1006. The "Fortunate 400" are the four hundred taxpay-
ers reporting the highest individual income. See Michael Parisi & Michael Strudler, Inter-
nal Revenue Serv., The 400 Individual Income Tax Returns Reporting the Highest Adjusted Gross
Incomes Each Yew; 1992-2000, STATIsTics or INCOME BULL., Spring 2003, at 7-9, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/00in400h.pdf; Martin A. Sullivan, The Rich Get Soaked While
the Super Rich Slide, 101 Tnx NOTES 581, 581 (2003).
10 McMahon, supra note 1, at 1006.
11
 See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-
1918, 68 Qj. ECON. 1, 15 tbl.11l (2003).
12 The only possible exception is home ownership, which would occur in quintiles other
than the top one, but probably not in the bottom quintile, which is the focus of concern.
IS See McMahon, supra note 1, at 1019. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances
indicate that approximately one-third of wealth is held by the top 1%, one-third by the
next 9%, and one-third by the bottom 90%, of which the lowest 50% held only 3% of the
total wealth. Id. The data indicate that the top group holds a disproportionate share of
stocks, bonds, and real estate investments, which are likely to include unrealized apprecia-
tion. Arthur B. Kennickell, A Rolling Tide: Changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the U.S.,
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with economic income, the data cited by Professor McMahon do in-
clude some unrealized appreciation and show that wealth is even more
highly concentrated than income." Thus, taking unrealized apprecia-
tion into account would probably increase the income gap.
Professor McMahon also presents data to demonstrate the in-
creasing disparity between the top and bottom in after-tax income.'s
Again, the data confirm Professor McMahon's basic argument that the
gulf between the rich (particularly the super-rich) and the poor is rap-
idly increasing.'s I have no quarrel with the basic proposition, but to
accurately measure the income gap, one needs to take into account
transfers from the government as well as transfers to the government.
Although the CBO's definition of income includes the value of income
received in kind, such as Medicare and Medicaid, food stamps, and the
like," the definition of after-tax income is notexhaustive. The IRS data
do not measure governmental transfers except to the extent of trans-
fers through the tax system, such as the earned income tax credit's I
do not believe that a completely accurate definition would change Pro-
fessor McMahon's basic point about the size of the gap, but a compre-
hensive definition would be essential to defining a solution.
One conclusion that Professor McMahon draws from the data is
that "the federal tax system has failed to respond adequately to take
into account ever increasing income inequality." 19 It is hard to argue
with the conclusion that the tax system has not eroded the gap, al-
though reasonable people can differ as to whether it should do so."
Professor McMahon clearly believes it should.° Near the end of his
Article he urges us "to reverse the Matthew Effect" by increasing pro-
gressivity. 22 He proposes to do so by increasing marginal rates for the
rich and especially for the super-rich."
1989-2001, at 15 (2003), available at hup://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/papers/
conceit tration.2001.10.pdf.
14 Compare, e.g., McMahon, supra note 1, at 1001 (presenting data on income), with
McMahon, supra note 1, at 1019 (presenting data on wealth).
Id. at 1012-16.
16 Id.
17 See CoNG, BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3-4.
18 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 8, at 96-97.
19 McMahon, supra note 1, at 996.
20 I agree with Professor McMahon and others who support progressivity, but I have
nothing to add to his recitation of the arguments.
21 McMahon, supra note 1, at 1128.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1122-28.
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR MCMAHON'S CONCLUSION
Although I agree with three of Professor McMahon's proposi-
tions—that the rich are getting richer and the poor relatively poorer,
that something must be done to deal with increasing income inequal-
ity, and that income tax rates should be more progressive 24—I disagree
with the suggestion that increasing the tax rates on the super-rich will
reverse the Matthew effect. Professor McMahon's real concern is with
redistributing the tax burden more equitably, and to that end he fa-
vors increased progressivity. 25 But increased progressivity alone will
not eliminate the income gap or the Matthew effect, 26 although it is
an essential piece of the solution. To eliminate the income gap, pro-
gressivity must be coupled with redistribution. What we take from Pe-
ter we must give to Paul.
Progressive tax rates redistribute the tax burden. Progressivity re-
sults in redistribution because those in the lowest quintile bear little or
very little of the obligation to fund public goods. Although progressivity
is an important source of redistribution, it does very little to address the
income gap. The bottom 20% of filers, for example, already bear al-
most none of the federal income tax burden, 27 and there are many who
do not need to file and thus have no tax liability. Despite this redistribu-
tion of the tax burden, there remains a significant income gap.
Suppose that the marginal rates on the top quintile were in-
creased sufficiently so that the rate on the bottom quintile of filers was
reduced to zero. That would constitute a significant increase in pro-
gressivity. Without more, however, the income position of the bottom
quintile would barely change. Table 1 illustrates this.
24 Id. at 993-98.
26 See id. at 1101.
26 These are not the same. Even if the rich did not get any richer nor the poor any
poorer, there would still be a significant—and unacceptable—income gap.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 8, at 011.1.1, col. 15.
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Table 1: Elimination of Tax Liability for Bottom Quintile"
Income in Cohort Number Returns Current Tax Liability Avenge Per
Return
Income Without
Tax
$0 1,438,000 $91,634,000 $64 $6064
$0-1000 1,838,000 $1,276,000 $ 1 $6501
$1000-2000 2,642,000 $34,403,000 $13 $7513
$2000-3000 2,729,000 $40,200,000 $15 $8515
;3000-4000 2,696,000 $31,406,000 $12 $9512
$4000-5000 2,687,000 $51,777,000 $19 $10,519
$5000-6000 2,463,000 $98,418,000 $40 $11,540
$6000-7000 2,492,000 $153,259,000 $62 $12,562
$7000-8000 2,523,000 $193,524,000 $77 $13,577
$8009-9000 2,453,000 $251,982,000 $103 $14,603
$9000-10,000 2,424,000 $363,092,000 $150 $15,650
$10,000-11,000 2,479,238 $482,851,000 $195 $16,695
$11,000-12,000 2,290,492 $621,691,000 $271 $17,771
31,154,730 $2,415,513,000
AGI by Cohort Number/Returns Additional Tax/Return
$500,000-1,000,000 354,612
31,000,000-1,500,000 85,193
$1,500,000-2,000,000 36,326
$2,000,000-5,000,000 51,964
$5,000,000-10,000,000 12,205
Over $10,000,000 6811
547,111 $4415
Table 1 uses IRS statistics for 2001, 29 the most recent year available, and
assumes that the 2001 federal income tax liability for the bottom quin-
tile was not assessed. Using an average tax per return in each cohort, the
unassessed tax is assumed to increase the income of each individual in
the cohort." The figures in column five represent the income for each
cohort if no federal income taxes were levied." It is only in the last co-
hort that taxes drag the cohort below the poverty level. Even if federal
income tax liability were eliminated, all other cohorts would fall below
28 Table 1 is calculated using IRS figures for the 2001 tax year. See generally INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., supra note 8.
" See grnerally id.
3D The tax liability in column three is divided by the number of returns in column two
to get the average tax per return for each cohort.
st As explained further below, each taxpayer in the cohort is presumed to have the
mid-level of income for the cohort and to, have $6000 of current government benefits con-
stituting income (although not taxable income). Thus, someone in the second cohort
starts with $6500 of income.
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the poverty leve1. 32 The federal income tax revenue from the bottom
quintile was $2.4 billion. If each taxpayer in the top quintile paid an
equal share of the decrease, each would owe $4415 more in taxes. That
would take about a 1% across-the-board increase in marginal tax rates in
the top cohorts. A result that leaves the bottom 20% below the poverty
level and the top with no real dent in their incomes does not exactly put
a brake on the Matthew effect.
Whether the disparity between the top and bottom quintiles would
decrease depends on whether the government would do anything dif-
ferently than it currently does with the $2.4 billion collected from the
top quintile rather than the bottom quintile. If rates were made even
more progressive than necessary to eliminate the tax liability of the bot-
tom quintile, then any change in income disparities would depend on
what the government did with the additional funds. If, for example, the
funds were allocated in exactly the way that they are allocated currently,
or if they were all directed toward military spending, the income gap
would still be huge." And recall that the taxes paid by the bottom 20%
are roughly 0.1% of the total individual income taxes collected—not
enough to have any effect on the income gap."
To eliminate the gap—through government intervention—the
government not only must collect significant additional taxes from
the rich, but it also must redistribute what it collects through cash,
goods, or services to those in the bottom quintiles. In other words, we
must agree not only to increased progressive rates, but also to the re-
distribution of tax revenue to the poor.
III. WHY REDISTRIBUTION MUST ACCOMPANY PROGRESSIVE RATES TO
ELIMINATE INCOME GAP: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
To get a sense of why redistribution must accompany progressive
rates, consider the following thought experiment, which is designed to
show how eliminating the income gap through the tax system might be
accomplished. This extremely modest experiment asks what kind of
32 See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH Sc HUMAN SERVS., THF. 2001 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES, at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/Olpoverty.htm (last updated May 3, 2004) (presenting data
from Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,695 (Feb. 16, 2001)). In
2001, the poverty level for a family of four was $17,650. Id.
33 It is likely that no matter what the government did with the additional revenues,
there would be some change in the income gap. For example, if all of the funds were
dedicated to the military, it is possible that military salaries would increase, raising the
income of privates at the bottom of the income scale.
34 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Slipra note S. at tb1.1.1, col. 15.
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progressivity would be needed to insure that most individuals in the
United States would have "income" above the poverty leve1. 36 Those
with income below the poverty level would receive a demogrant (a cash
grant from the government) to make up the difference.
To test the propositi6n, I used the IRS statistics for 2001, 36 and
the Department of Health and Human Services poverty guidelines. 37
In 2001, the poverty level was $17,650 for a family of four and $8590
for a single individual." The status of individuals is determined by
using their adjusted gross income ("AGI"). To account for current
government transfers, I assumed that everyone with $12,000 AGI or
less already has nontaxable government transfers of $6000, funded by
current revenues." Thus, someone (in a family) with AGI of $11,650
would be ineligible for a demogrant; an individual with AGI of $2590
would be ineligible. 40 To determine the total amount of revenue
needed, I arbitrarily decided that everyone in each cohort has the
midpoint level of AGI. Thus, the cohort with AGI between $0 and
$1000 includes 1,800,000 people, with each assumed to have $500 of
income and $6000 of nontaxable benefits.
To further simplify, I assumed that one-quarter of the individuals
in each cohort are single and three-quarters constitute families of
four.'" Thus, one-quarter of the individuals in this cohort would need
" This approach would do very little to eliminate either the income gap or the Mat-
thew effect, but even this limited effort will serve to illustrate the basic point—that it would
be very difficult to eliminate either through the tax system.
56 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 8, at tb1.1.1, col. 1. These statistics include
the number of taxpayers in each income cohort. Id. At the bottom on the income scale,
each cohort has a $1000 range; at the top end, they jump by $500,000 to $5 million with
everyone over $10 million landing in the same cohort. Id. As Professor McMahon points
out, that lumps the super-rich with the merely rich. See McMahon, supra note 1, at 1002.
37 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 32.
" Id. To make the experiment simple, I have used only two of the guidelines, one for
individuals and one for families. It is.thus too high for some small families to escape pov-
erty and too low for large families.
39 This could be in kind transfers such as food stamps or tax benefits such as the
earned income tax credit.
4° In practice, stopping the demogrant abruptly without a phase-out is unworkable be-
cause it is inefficient and unfair, but adding a phase-out would not change the basic propo-
sition.
41
 It is impossible to tell exactly how many individuals and families fall into each pov-
erty category. The U.S. Census Bureau reports extensive data about those in poverty, but
does not break the data out into cohorts matching the poverty guidelines. The figures for
2001 roughly indicate that individuals without families make up about one-quarter of the
total number of people living in poverty. BUREAU OF LABOR & STATISTICS & BUREAU OF
TIIE CENSUS, Detailed Poverty Tables: 2001 P60 Package, in CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY,
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a demogrant of $2090 to bring them to the $8590 poverty level and
three-quarters would need $11,150 to bring them to the $17,650 pov-
erty leve1.42 Table 2 shows the calculation of the amount of govern-
ment revenues needed to accomplish this. As seen in the right-hand
column, the amount required is $140 billion.
Table 2: Demogrant Needed to Bring Bottom 20% to Poverty Level/IRS Statistics ."
Income in CohortNumber Returns Amount of Giant Amount of Gmni Total/Cohort
3/4 Family of Four 1/4 Single
$0 1,438,000 $11,650 $2590 $13,495,630,000
$16,330,630,000$0-1000 1,838,000 _111,150 $2090
$1000-2000 2,642,000 $10,150 $1090 $20,112,225,000
$2000-300 2,729,000 $9150 $90 $18,727,762,500
$3000-4000 2,696,000 $8150 $0 $16,479,300,000
$4000-5000 2,687,000 $7150 $0 $14,409,037,500
$11,360,587,500
$9,625,350,000
$5000-6000 2,463,000 $6150 $0
$6000-7000 2,492,000 $5150 $0
$7000-8000 2,523,000 4150 $0 $7,852,837,500
$5,795,212,500$8000-9000 2,453,000 $3150 $0
$9000-10,000 2,424,000 $2150 $0 $3,908,700,000
$2,138,342,775	 •$10,000-11,000 2,479,238 $1150 $0
$11,000-12,000 2,290,492 $150 $0 $257,680,350
$140,493,295,625
Now apply Professor McMahon's suggestion that we increase the
marginal rates on income exceeding $500,000. 44 The current effective
tax rate is approximately 20% to 24% for this group.45 I assumed that
current taxes collected fund both public goods and any redistribution
that produces the current income status. If we want additional gov-
ernment redistribution, we need additional tax revenue." Table 3
ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT (Sept. 2002), http://ferret.b1s.census.gov/macro/
032002/pov/toc.htm (last revised July 14, 2004).
42 This is not to suggest that this is a good way to accomplish the goal of providing
minimum incomes. A demogrant to those with no incomes and a guaranteed minimum
income has work disincentive effects. The income effect of a demogrant would discourage
labor efforts.
43 Table 2 is calculated using IRS figures for the 2001 tax year. See generally INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., SUp/a. note 8.
44 McMahon, supra note 1, at 997.
45 See I.R.C. § 1 (2000).
46 The point of this exercise is to see how the income gap might be eliminated
through direct redistribution through the tax system. That is not the only way, of course, to
accomplish this. Redistribution might be accomplished, for example, by significantly in-
creasing the incentives for charitable giving, particularly to those organizations that in-
crease the "income" or the standard of living of those in the bottom cohorts.
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shows what would happen if we significantly increased the marginal
brackets applying to the "rich," that is, those whose AGI falls in cohorts
above $500,000. An example of the necessary marginal tax schedule is
in the last column. I arbitrarily assumed that everyone in a cohort had
the average income of the cohort. 47 So, for example, in the first co-
hort, each of the 354,612 returns would owe an additional amount of
taxes equal to $13,382 or a total of $4.7 billion additional revenue. 48
Table 3: Increase in Marginal Rates Needed to Fund Demogrant49
AGI by Cohort Number/Returns Taxable Income Income Per Return
$500,000-1,000,000 354,612 $211,318,031,000 $533,455
$1,000,000-1,500,000 85,193 $91,492,389,000 $919,429
$1,500,000-2,000,000 36,326 $55,760,182,000 $1,250,733
$2,000,000-5,000,000 51,964 $138,523,230,000 $2,074,695
$5,000,000-10,000,000 12,205 $74,551,405,000 $4,233,470
Over $10,000,000 6811 $153,369,759,000 $13,675,413
547,111 $725,014,996,000
Additional Tax Total Additional Tax Tax Schedule
$13,382 $9,745,406,467 $500,000-1,000,000 40%
$167,772 $14,292,969,073 $1,000,000-1,500,000 43%
$307,815 $11,181,694,592 $1,500,000-2,000,000 46%
$683,841 $35,535,134,510 $2,000,000-5,000,000 52%
$1,806,409 $22,047,165,702 $5,000,000-10,000,000 60%
$7,594,018 $51,722,859,663 Over $10,000,000 65%
$139,525,230,006
These calculations illustrate why eliminating the tax gap through in-
creased progressivity cannot be done on the back of the super-rich
alone. With this rate schedule, imposing additional taxes on the top
47 Column four is calculated by dividing the number of returns in the second column
into the total taxable income for the cohort in the third column. The number of returns
and taxable income in each cohort is found in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 8, at
tb1.1.1, cols. 1-2. Note that the number of returns with taxable income in each cohort is
less than the number of returns with the same AGI in each cohort because itemized de-
ductions reduced the AGI. See id.
18 Column six is calculated by applying the top marginal tax rate in the last column to
the amount of income that exceeds the minimum in the cohort and multiplying the result
by the number of returns. For example, each individual in the first cohort is assumed to
have $533,455 of taxable income. The amount exceeding $500,000 or $33,455 would be
subject to a 40% marginal rate, producing an additional tax of $13,382 for each return.
The additional tax owed by the 354,612 individuals in this cohort produces $4.7 billion
more in revenue. One effect of using this averaging rule is that average taxable income per
return falls below the minimum for the cohort for several of the cohorts.
49 Table 3 is calculated using IRS figures for the 2001 tax year. See generally INTERNAL
REVENUE. SERV., supra note 8. I ran similar calculations with the CB0 numbers and ended
up in approximately the same place.
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cohort would not fund even this modest redistribution. 50 Although
the super-rich would fund slightly less than 40% of the tax increase,
higher rates on all taxpayers with income above $500,000 would be
necessary to fund this redistribution.
Another possibility is simply to apply a surtax on the rich. Table 4
shows that one would need a 92% surtax on the super-rich (those above
$10 million) in order to fund this redistribution. Alternatively, a surtax of
31% on all taxpayers with income over $500,000 would also fund the re-
distribution.5 i The surtax on the super-rich would have the greatest effect
on the income gap. A 92% surtax on all income exceeding $500,000
comes very close to government confiscation of that income and essen-
tially would set a cap on labor income. A significant problem with a 92%
surtax is the effect on labor and savings decisions. On the one hand, sub-
stantially increasing progressivity may be welfare-enhancing because the
welfare of the poor is increased more than the welfare of the rich is de-
creased. On the other hand, any disincentive effect could offset the
change to welfare. Ideally, the government would choose an optimal
rate,52 but it is highly likely that the optimal rate would be well below 92%,
thus precluding the use of a surtax on the rich to fund this redistribution.
Table 4: Surtax Needed To Fund Demogrant"
AGI by Cohort Taxable Income
500,000-1,000,000 211,318,031,000
1,000,000-1,500,000 91,492,389,000
1,500,000-2,000.000 55,760,182,000
2,000,000-5,000,000 138,523,230,000
5,000,000-10,000,000 74,551,405,000
Over 10,000,000 153,369,759,000
TOTAL $725,014,996,000
92% surtax on super-rich $137,967,118,280
31% surtax on rich $139,952,443,760
8° The revenue produced by a top marginal rate of 65% on the cohort with AG1 over
$10 million is only $51 billion. The amount of revenue necessary cannot even be produced
with marginal rates running from 50% to 90% on the super-rich. There is nothing that
precludes extremely progressive rates on the super-rich, although this calculation does not
include other taxes such as Social Security and Medicare taxes, state income taxes, sales
and property taxes, corporate taxes, excise taxes, and the like.
'The surtax is calculated by multiplying the surtax rate times all income that exceeds
$500,000.
52 See generally 1A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in The Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. ECON. Sum. 175 (1971). The notion behind the experiment is not to choose the
optimal rate but to show that it would have to be fairly high.
53 Table 4 is calculated using IRS figures for the 2001 tax year. See generally INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., supra note 8.
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A third possibility is to increase effective rates by widening the tax
base.54 One obvious potential target is capital income. Although the tax
burden on capital is not significant, 55 the revenue is potentially substan-
tial.° But while it may be worthwhile to subject capital to taxation for
equity reasons, 57 Congress has created numerous avenues of escape
that either defer taxation of capital or exempt it. 58 There are also myr-
iad ways that investors currently avoid taxation without the benefit of
statutory authority." Shoring up the current rules for taxing periodic
income and realized appreciation would contribute to progressivity, par-
ticularly because the bulk of capital is held by the wealthy. Subjecting
unrealized appreciation to capital income also could widen the base.
Although the theoretical reasons to widen the base are strong,
there are some serious practical problems.6° Furthermore, the in-
crease in global markets makes it increasingly difficult for the United
States to tax capital income. Closing other loopholes, particularly
those used by the wealthy, would also increase revenues, but the basic
point is the same. Increasing the tax burden on the wealthy by widen-
ing the base will change the relative income tax burdens, but will not
change the income gap.
54 Professor McMahon proposes eliminating the preferential rates on capital gains.
McMahon, supra note 1, at 1127-28.
55 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a
Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk! Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. Rev. 377,393-95 (1992). For
proofs of the proposition that given certain assumptions, an income tax imposes a burden
only on the risk-free return, see Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the
Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17,29-39 (1996), and Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much
Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Gash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV, 1,
6-13 (1996).
56 When subject to a nominal tax on capital, investors will make portfolio adjustments
such that the tax burden is no more than the nominal rate times the risk-free rate on their
entire portfolio. The risk premium bears no tax burden. Investors accomplish this by scal-
ing up the amount of their risky investments. Unless the government adjusts its portfolio,
the government becomes a "co-investor" in the larger amount of risky investment and its
expected return; that is, revenue rises.
sr Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423,456—
74 (2000).
55 See, e.g., 1.R.C. § 168 (2000) (accelerating depreciation); Id. § 179 (same); Id. § 354
(deferring taxation of gains); Id. § 1031 (same); Id. § 103 (exempting certain interest).
59 For example, taxpayers often use financial instruments to defer the tax on unreal-
ized appreciation by monetizing the gain without an appreciation event, One example is
an equity swap.
6° See Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Analysis of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. Ray, (355
2004).
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IV. THREE LESSONS FROM THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
I draw three lessons from this thought experiment. First, even if
the entire tax burden were lifted from the poor by increasing the
progressivity of rates on the rich, there would be little effect on the
income gap. Second, even fairly radical redistribution--dernogrants
financed by more progressive tax rates to ensure that everyone's in-
come exceeds the poverty level—would have little effect on the in-
come gap. Keep in mind that this is actually minimal redistribution if
what we really want to do is attack income inequality. In the thought
experiment, there would be roughly 20% of families with $17,000,
and approximately 0.5% would have average after-tax incomes rang-
ing from $337,500 to $6,350,000. 61
Third, a dramatic change in the income gap cannot be funded by
Bill Gates and Warren Buffett alone. The reason is the Luke effect. The
Gospel of Luke repeats Matthew's warning that the rich will get richer
and the poor poorer. But it also includes the following passage: Jesus
says to a rich man, "'Sell all that you own and distribute the money to
the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven' .... But when he heard
this, [the rich man] became sad; for he was very rich."62 Jesus replied,
"Indeed, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than
for someone who is rich to enter the kingdom of God. " 63 To put this
more colloquially, the rich love their money and will not give it up easily.
Professor McMahon essentially suggests that we will avoid the
Luke effect by giving it up for them. As he proposes, we could impose
more steeply progressive rates on those earning above $500,000. This
much probably seems plausible to most of us because the tax rates
would be imposed on "the rich," by which we mean those who are
richer than we are. But consider the increase in rates on the rich nec-
essary to achieve even modest redistribution—redistribution that
would have only limited effect on the income gap. In today's political
climate it is hard to imagine tax rates rising to 65%, even if they only
applied to the super-rich. The political viability of such a tax increase
would not seem to be enhanced if it were enacted for the explicit
purpose of redistribution to the poor. And the disincentive effect of
essentially confiscating all wages exceeding $500,000 would surely
take a high surtax on only the super-rich off the table.
61 Table 1, supra note 28.
62 Luke 18:22-23 (New Revised Standard).
64 Id. at 18:25.
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Widening the base as the means of increasing progressivity would
also seem to run smack into the Luke effect. Eliminating any of the
three largest "tax expenditures"—breaks for home ownership, medi-
cal care, and pension contributions—would increase all three reve-
nues and progressivity significantly. But neither approach seems po-
litically viable, and both probably contribute to the well-being of lower
and middle cohorts.
CONCLUSION
The lesson of my thought experiment is that it will be very
difficult to eliminate the Matthew effect through the federal tax sys-
tem. We cannot avoid the Luke effect by focusing only on the super-
rich. We must do it to ourselves. There is no way to decrease the in-
come gap in any meaningful manner without increasing the progres-
sivity of rates applying to those far down the food chain. And the addi-
tional revenue collected from increasing progressivity would need to
be redistributed in benefits to the poor. Eliminating the Matthew ef-
fect through the tax system requires two extremely difficult steps. In-
deed, it may be much easier for a camel to go through the eye of a
needle.
